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Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective
Soviet and Russian Masculinities: Rethinking Soviet
Fatherhood after Stalin and Renewing Virility
in the Russian Nation under Putin*
Amy E. Randall
Santa Clara University

After losing the Cold War and enduring a political, social, and economic environment beset with problems throughout the 1990s, Russians yearned for stability and a leader unlike the ﬁrst post-Soviet Russian President, Boris Yeltsin.
Although initially a popular ﬁgure who promised democratization in a new
Russia, Yeltsin’s erratic political behavior and public drunkenness and buffoonery complemented his powerlessness in preventing the decline of Russia’s international prestige and economy. When Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin as president in 2000, he appeared to offer disciplined and strong leadership as well as
a new direction for Russia. Utilizing domestic political strategies, including repression, Putin consolidated power, stabilized the economy, and bolstered the
social security of citizens. Barred from a third consecutive term as president in
2008, he retained his political dominance as prime minister until he became president once again in 2012. In 2014 Putin authorized the invasion of the sovereign
country of Ukraine and reclaimed Crimea as Russian territory. He has also directed an aggressive military intervention in Syria and meddled in the elections of
foreign countries, including the United States. At home, Putin has projected an
image of himself as a model of powerful masculinity and promoted socially conservative “Russian” values and policies, some of them homophobic and misogynistic, as part of his effort to advance an anti-Western and masculinized Russian
nationalism. Under his rule, Russia has reasserted itself as a masculine world
power—ﬂexing its political virility, economic independence, and technological
and military might.
Putin’s macho image, the media face of Russia’s new strength, has fascinated
Russians and non-Russians alike and has generated considerable public and
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scholarly analysis.1 Whether co-piloting a jet ﬁghter plane, sporting a muscular
bare chest while ﬁshing in southern Siberia, or demonstrating judo moves in
public, Putin has served as an icon of renewed Russian masculinity. Putin’s strategic use of hypermasculine imagery, including the sexualization of his male
persona, has been an important tool in legitimizing his rule, “remasculinizing”
the country internationally and domestically, and reasserting Russia’s strength.
Although it was ﬁrst posed as the antithesis to the “ﬂabby and weak” Yeltsin,
Putin’s virility also serves as a stark contrast to the “gerontological Soviet leadership of the late Brezhnev era” and the impotence of the last Communist leader,
Mikhail Gorbachev, in preventing the collapse of the Soviet Union.2
Historically, Putin’s strength is also counterposed to the weaknesses associated
with the post-Stalin, late Soviet, and early post-Soviet man. Starting in the 1950s
under Nikita Khrushchev’s new leadership and persisting into the Brezhnev era
in the 1960s, a veritable discursive explosion in the media, prescriptive texts, and
public venues offered a stinging indictment of the failures of Soviet fatherhood
and entreated men to become more engaged fathers. The Communist Party fostered this critique by turning its attention to the “serious shortcomings” in childrearing and instructing local party organizations to evaluate workers on the basis
not only of their public roles but also of their personal conduct, including how
men “educated [their] children” and behaved in their families. It rebuked speciﬁc
fathers who corrupted their sons through their bad behavior and explained that if
a “son growing up under the same roof as his Communist father” undermined
Communist principles, then the father had neglected to “fulﬁll his civic and party
duties.”3 Although the Communist Party directed attention to fathers’ roles in
children’s upbringing and increasingly criticized and disciplined male comrades
1
T. B. Riabova and O. V. Riabov, “Nastoiashchii muzhchina Rossiiskoi politiki?,”
POLIS: Politicheskie issledovanii 5 (2010): 48–63, and Riabova and Riabov, “Gairopa:
Gendernoe izmerenie obraza Evropy v praktikakh politicheskoi mobilatsii,” Zhenshchina v rossiiskom obshchestve 3 (2013): 31–39; Helena Goscilo, ed., Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon (New York, 2013); Andrew Foxhall, “Photographing Vladimir
Putin: Masculinity, Nationalism, and Visuality in Russian Political Culture,” Geopolitics
18, no. 1 (2013): 132–56; Valerie Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy
in Russia (Oxford, 2015); Elizabeth Wood, “Hypermasculinity as a Scenario of Power:
Vladimir Putin’s Iconic Rule, 1999–2008,” International Feminist Journal of Politics
18, no. 3 (2016): 329–50; Alexandra Novitskaya, “Patriotism, Sentiment, and Male Hysteria: Putin’s Masculinity Politics and the Persecution of Non-Heterosexual Russians,”
NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity Studies 12, nos. 3–4 (2017): 302–18.
2
Eliot Borenstein, Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular
Culture (Ithaca, NY, 2007), 226, and Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, 61, respectively.
3
Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, tom 2 (Moscow, 2006), 117–18. Also see Edward Cohn, “Sex and the Married Communist: Marital Inﬁdelity, Family Troubles,
and Communist Party Discipline in the Post-War USSR, 1945–1964,” Russian Review
68, no. 3 (July 2009): 429–50.
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for demonstrating unworthy family conduct, such as adultery, child abandonment and abuse, and drunkenness, it was not the sole or main actor calling for
better fathers.4 Experts and teachers armed with pedagogical knowledge and
professional authority, as well as educational activists, framed these discussions
and created mechanisms for transforming fatherhood in the late 1950s and 1960s.
Ordinary people from many walks of life, including fathers, also decried “typical” fathering practices and participated in what I will call the campaign to transform Soviet fatherhood.
This article investigates efforts by institutions, groups, and individuals to advance a new ideal father and family man in the late 1950s and 1960s. It argues
that the problematization of Soviet fatherhood can help us to understand the popularity of Putin’s machismo today. The criticism of inadequate fathering, in conjunction with a broader critique of men’s personal conduct by the Communist
Party, Komsomol (Young Communist League), comrades’ courts, women’s councils, voluntary street patrols, and many other organizations and individuals, exposed the weaknesses and failures of Soviet men and contributed to the emergence of what Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova have deemed a “crisis
of masculinity” discourse in the late Soviet era.5 After the Soviet Union’s collapse
in 1991, the idea of a masculinity crisis persisted as men struggled to succeed in a
new political and economic system.6 The ongoing narrative of failed manhood
provides a window not only into the appeal of Putin and his strongman persona
but also into the broader narratives of masculinized nationalism in contemporary
Russia.

4
For some Komsomol efforts to improve fathering, see “Dela semeinye,” Molodoi
kommunist (hereafter MK ) 8 (1963): 71; A. Osmanov, “Muzhskoi vopros,” MK 9 (1963):
88–89; A. Kharchev, “O schast’e molodoi sem’i,” MK 2 (1956): 98–99.
5
Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova, “Krizis maskulinnosti v pozdnesovetskom
diskurse,” in O muzhe[N]stvennosti: Sbornik statei, ed. Sergei Ushakin (Moscow, 2002),
and Temkina and Zdravomyslova, “The Crisis of Masculinity in Late Soviet Discourse,”
Russian Studies in History, ed. Amy Randall, 51, no. 2 (2012): 13–34.
6
Marina Kiblitskaya, “‘Once We Were Kings’: Male Experiences of Loss of Status at
Work in Post-Communist Russia,” and Elena Mershcherkina, “New Russian Men: Masculinity Regained?,” in Gender, State, and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, ed. Sarah
Ashwin (New York, 2000), 90–104 and 105–17; Irina Tartakovskaia, “ ‘Nesostoiavshchaiasia maskulinnost’ kak tip povedeniia na rynke truda,” in Gendernye otnosheniia
v sovremennoi Rossii: Issledovaniia 1990–kh godov, ed. L. Popkova and I. Tartakovskaia
(Samara, 2003), 42–71; Rebecca Kay, Men in Contemporary Russia: The Fallen Heroes
of Post-Soviet Change? (Aldershot, 2006); Tetyana Bureychek, “Masculinity in Soviet
and Post-Soviet Ukraine: Models and Their Implications,” in Gender, Politics, and Society
in Ukraine, ed. Elena Havinsky and Anastasiya Salnykova (Toronto, 2012), 325–61;
Jennifer Utrata, Women without Men: Single Mothers and Family Change in the New
Russia (Ithaca, NY, 2015).
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Family and Communist Manhood prior to Khrushchev’s Rule
The study of masculinities in Imperial Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet societies
is a growing ﬁeld of inquiry.7 It has shed light on the “hegemonic” masculinity of
the New Soviet Man ﬁrst promoted in the 1920s—a construct that emphasized
hypervirility and dedication to building and defending Soviet socialism—as
well as other paradigms of manhood during Stalin’s rule (1928–53), underscoring R. W. Connell’s point that “hegemonic” masculinity is not monolithic but is
always constructed in relation to both “femininities” and other masculinities.8
More recent scholarship has examined the diverse masculinities that coexisted
during the post–World War II and late Soviet years, such as Cold War masculinities linked to technology, science, diplomacy, and athleticism/sports,9 as well
as masculinities detached from or opposed to state interests, such as those linked
to the banya (bathhouse) or to car ownership.10 Signiﬁcantly, like the earlier
7
This new scholarship ﬁrst included articles in Gendernye issledovaniia, Sotsialisticheskie issledovaniia, and Sotsiologicheskii zhurnal; Ashwin, Gender, State, and Society; I. A. Morozov, ed., Muzhskoi sbornik. Vyp. 1: Muzhchina v traditsionnoi kul’ture
(Moscow, 2001); Ushakin, O muzhe[N]stvennosti; Eliot Bornstein, Men without Women:
Masculinity and Revolution in Russian Fiction, 1917–1929 (Durham, NC, 2000); Dan
Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago, 2001); Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan
Healey, eds., Russian Masculinities in History and Culture (Basingstoke, 2002).
8
R. W. Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person, and Sexual Politics (Cambridge, 1987); Lilya Kaganovsky, How the Soviet Man Was Unmade: Cultural Fantasy
and Male Subjectivity under Stalin (Pittsburgh, 2008); Frances Bernstein, “Prosthetic
Manhood in the Soviet Union at the End of World War II,” OSIRIS 30 (2015): 113–
33; Catherine Merridale, “Masculinity at War: Did Gender Matter in the Soviet Army?,”
Journal of War and Culture Studies 5, no. 3 (2012): 307–20; Steven Jug, “Red Army Romance: Preserving Masculine Hegemony in Mixed Gender Combat Units, 1943–1944,”
Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 3 (2012): 321–34; Kerstin Bischl, “Telling Stories:
Gender Relationships and Masculinity in the Red Army, 1941–45,” in Women and
Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and Its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Maren Roger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Osnabriick, 2012), 117–33; Dale
Robert, “ ‘Being a Real Man’: Masculinities During and After the Great Patriotic War,”
in Gender and the Second World War: The Lessons of War, ed. Corinna Peniston-Bird
and Emma Vickers (London, 2017), 116–34.
9
Erica Fraser, “Masculinity in the Personal Narratives of Soviet Nuclear Physicists,”
Aspasia 8 (2014): 45–63, and Fraser, “Yuri Gagarin and Celebrity Masculinity in Soviet
Culture,” in Gender, Sexuality, and the Cold War, ed. Philip Muehlenbeck (Nashville,
TN, 2017), 270–89; Julie Gilmour and Barbara Evans Clements, “If You Want to Be Like
Me, Train!: The Contradictions of Soviet Masculinity,” in Evans et al., Russian Masculinities in History and Culture, 210–21; Brandon Miller, “Between Creation and Chaos:
Soviet Masculinities, Consumption, and Bodies after Stalin” (PhD diss., Michigan State
University, 2013).
10
Igor Kon, Muzhchina v meniaiushchemsia mire (Moscow, 2009); Ethan Pollock,
“Real Men Go to the Banya: Postwar Soviet Masculinities and the Bathhouse,” Kritika:
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hegemonic masculine ideal, these models of manliness were mostly performed
outside the domestic sphere, frequently in homosocial settings that celebrated
male camaraderie. Although they typically afﬁrmed Soviet gender norms and
heterosexuality, serving to demarcate acceptable and unacceptable masculinities
and sexualities, members of the LGBT community also enacted their own masculinities (and femininities) in diverse ways, sometimes even in the same allmale spaces.11
The promotion of a new type of fatherhood in the 1950s and 1960s marked a
sea change from constructions of manhood in the early Soviet and Stalin years,
when fathers were largely marginalized in discourses about the family and active
parenting was not central to masculine identity. Although Communist leaders
linked normative manhood to fatherhood, they encouraged men to see the family
as secondary to the central task of building socialism. The ideal New Soviet
Man, envisioned as a worker and citizen who forged his masculinity in service
to the party-state, was frequently depicted as a soldier defending the motherland,
an industrial worker and collective farmer laboring on the industrial and grain
“front,” and a stalwart member of the Communist Party dedicated to the Soviet
regime. Meanwhile, new policies and laws that were designed to disrupt men’s
traditional patriarchal authority, promote women’s legal and economic equality,
glorify reproduction and motherhood, and establish the state as the new paternal
power that protected mothers and children diminished fathers’ roles in families
(notwithstanding some men’s more signiﬁcant engagement in child-rearing) and
fostered a Soviet model of alienated fatherhood.12 Despite the Soviet regime’s
nod to men’s importance in the nuclear family in 1936 when it made divorce
more difﬁcult to obtain, leaders did not fundamentally reimagine fathers’ roles.13
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 11, no. 1 (2010): 47–76; Dunja Popovic,
“A Generation That Has Squandered Its Men: The Late Soviet Crisis of Masculinity in
the Poetry of Sergei Gandlevskii,” Russian Review 70 (October 2011): 665; Brian Hinote
and Gretchen Webber, “Drinking toward Manhood: Masculinity and Alcohol in the Former USSR,” Men and Masculinities 15, no. 3 (2012): 292–310; Mark Edele, “Strange
Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953,” Jahrbücherfür Geschichte Osteuropas 50, no. 1 (2002): 37–61; Zhanna Chernova, “Romantik
nashego vremeni: S pesnei po zhizni,” in Ushakin, O muzhe[N]stvennosti, 452–76; Lewis
Siegelbaum, “Cars, Cars, and More Cars,” in Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of
Soviet Russia, ed. Lewis Siegelbaum (Basingstoke, 2006), 96–97.
11
For queer masculinities in the 1950s and late Soviet period, see Dan Healey, Russian Homophobia from Stalin to Sochi (London, 2017); Arthur Clech, “Between the Labor Camp and the Clinic: Tema or the Shared Forms of Late Soviet Homosexual Subjectivities,” Slavic Review 77, no. 1 (2018): 6–29.
12
Scholarship on Soviet motherhood and family law is too extensive to cite in full.
See, e.g., Olga Issoupova, “From Duty to Pleasure: Motherhood in Soviet and PostSoviet Russia?,” in Ashwin, Gender, State, and Society, 30–54.
13
David Hoffmann, “Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in Its PanEuropean Context,” Journal of Social History 34, no. 1 (2000): 35–54, and Hoffmann,
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Visual culture reinforced alienated paternity by rarely featuring men as fathers,
instead depicting Stalin as the “universal father” of a communal and “great Soviet family.”14 Stalinist policies removed fathers from children’s lives: forced
collectivization and the drive for rapid industrialization as well as political repression and the purges resulted in men’s mass migration, deportation, incarceration, and death. World War II ruptured fathers’ connection to their families even
more, as many marched off to war and never returned.
Representations of Soviet men during the ﬁrst part of the Great Patriotic War
(World War II) departed from earlier images by depicting them as essential rather
than marginal family ﬁgures—as fathers and sons motivated to ﬁght because of
the need to defend their families.15 Nonvisual narratives of the war, such as personal interest stories and “private letters” published in the press, also emphasized
men’s motivations as family men to protect their loved ones. After the 1943 victory at Stalingrad, however, wartime press coverage shifted, increasingly emphasizing Stalin’s role in inspiring “heroic feats” and successes among ﬁghting men,
reasserting his importance as father-in-chief.16 As Stalin claimed credit for Soviet
victory, the press reported the populace’s gratitude to him for his “wise and fatherly
leadership” and “fatherly care” during and immediately following the war.17 After
the war, Stalin’s depiction not only as the paternal leader of the nation but also as
the surrogate father in individual families led to “to a domestication of the personality cult that distinguished it from its prewar counterpart.”18
Facing the huge loss of life (ultimately about 27 million deaths) from the war,
Communist leaders adopted a new Family Law in 1944 that reinforced the Soviet model of alienated fatherhood. To increase the birthrate and respond to the
signiﬁcant imbalance in the population’s male-to-female ratio, the law promoted
a novel solution, endorsing “single motherhood as [a] site for reproduction.” It
barred unwed mothers from claiming alimony or child support from fathers and
from listing paternity on their children’s birth certiﬁcates, which relieved men of
responsibilities for their extramarital offspring, and implicitly “sanction[ed]
Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941 (Ithaca, NY, 2003);
Lauren Kaminsky, “Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union,”
Central European History 44 (2011): 63–91.
14
Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual, 3d ed. (Bloomington, IN,
2000), 114–35; Catriona Kelly, Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890–1991
(New Haven, CT, 2007), 104–7; A. E. Zvonareva, Sovetskoe ottsovstvo: Stanovlenie,
konstruktirovanie i transformatsiia praktik (Ivanovo, 2014), 87–93.
15
Claire McCallum, “The Return: Postwar Masculinity and the Domestic Space in
Stalinist Visual Culture, 1945–53,” Russian Review 74, no. 1 (2015): 123.
16
Lisa Kirschenbaum, “ ‘Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families’: Local Loyalties and
Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda,” Slavic Review 59, no. 4 (2000): 842.
17
Jeffrey Brooks, Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War: Thank You,
Comrade Stalin! (Princeton, NJ, 2000), 204–5.
18
McCallum, “The Return,” 139.
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adultery” and philandering so that single and married men would “impregnate
millions of women.”19 The law encouraged unmarried women to reproduce by
promising government assistance for their children, expanding resources for childcare, and further glorifying motherhood by introducing new maternity awards
such as the Hero Mother medal (for ten or more children).
The new Family Law created a novel legal category of “fatherless” children
and contributed to 8.7 million “illegitimate births” between 1945 and 1955, with
similar numbers for the 1960s, resulting in a huge increase in “single-mother”
families.20 Although the Soviet regime continued to promote the heteronormative two-parent family as the ideal, it nonetheless legitimated families headed by
unmarried mothers.21 Meanwhile, with the important exception of ofﬁcial homecoming depictions of demobilized soldiers that emphasized bonds between fathers and children, print media and visual culture in the postwar period tended to
marginalize or omit fathers in representations of the family.22 If included, fathers
were often depicted negatively as drunkards or as mentally and physically disabled veterans who beneﬁted from the loving care of their wives.23 These depictions
mirrored popular sentiment among women in their complaints to authorities.24
Despite signiﬁcant changes in society after Stalin’s death in 1953, most scholarship has held that the Soviet model of alienated fatherhood remained relatively
stable and uncontested from the early revolutionary years until the late 1960s

19
Mie Nakachi, “N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, and Language,” East European Politics and Societies 20, no. 1 (2006): 46–
47, 60.
20
Nakachi, “N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law,” 64. As Nakachi
notes, the extremely poor supply of contraceptives also contributed to the burgeoning
birth rate.
21
Helene Carlbäck, “Lone Mothers and Fatherless Children,” in Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, ed. Melanie Ilič and Jeremy Smith (London, 2009), 86–
103; Greta Bucher, “Struggling to Survive: Soviet Women in the Postwar Years,” Journal of Women’s History 12, no. 1 (2000): 146; Susan Reid, “Women in the Home,” in
Women in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Melanie Ilič, Susan Reid, and Lynne Attwood (Basingstoke, 2004), 149–51.
22
McCallum, “The Return.”
23
Bucher, “Struggling to Survive,” 148; Anna Krylova, “Healers of Wounded Souls:
The Crisis of Private Life in Soviet Literature,” Journal of Modern History 73, no. 2
(2001): 324–29.
24
For women’s private complaints about men to Soviet authorities, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton,
NJ, 2005), 240–61; Cohn, “Sex and the Married Communist,” 429–50; Helene Carlbäck,
“Lone Motherhood in Soviet Russia in the Mid-20th Century: In a European Context,”
in And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and
Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe, ed. Helene Carlbäck, Yulia Gradskova, and
Zhanna Kravchenko (Budapest, 2012), 25–46.
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and 1970s.25 Some recent scholarship, however, has disrupted this narrative.26
So too does this article.

After the Death of Stalin, the Universal Father
When Nikita Khrushchev came to power after Stalin’s death in 1953, he promoted a series of reforms, including de-Stalinization, that have led many contemporaries and scholars since to characterize his rule as an era of liberalization.
Among other things, he denounced the violent excesses of Stalinism. As Khrushchev departed from a politics of persistent overt repression, he relied increasingly on the exercise of Soviet control via “normalizing” techniques (an existing
strategy). Seeking to discipline the everyday lives and practices of citizens and
to convince the populace “to live according to its tenets,” Khrushchev endorsed
moral renewal as ofﬁcial policy. As the Communist Party, the state, and volunteer organizations sought to enforce social norms and “Communist morality,”
they turned their gaze explicitly to personal and family matters.27 These changes
25
Zhanna Chernova, “The Model of Soviet Fatherhood: Discursive Prescriptions,”
Russian Studies in History 51, no. 2 (2012): 43, 54–59; Elena Zhidkova, “Family, Divorce, and Comrades’ Courts: Soviet Family and Public Organizations during the
Thaw,” in Carlbäck, And They Lived Happily Ever After, 47–64; Deborah Field, Private
Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York, 2007); Sergei Kukhterin,
“Fathers and Patriarchs in Communist and Post-Communist Russia,” in Ashwin, Gender,
State, and Society, 71–89; Greta Bucher, “Stalinist Families: Motherhood, Fatherhood, and
Building the New Soviet Person,” in The Making of Russian History: Society, Culture, and
the Politics of Modern Russia, ed. John Steinberg and Rex Wade (Bloomington, IN, 2009),
129–52; Natalia Chernyaeva, “Upbringing à la Dr. Spock: Child Care Manuals and
Constructing Normative Motherhood in the Soviet Union, 1954–1970,” Ab Imperio 2
(2013): 223–51; Yuliia Gradskova, “Educating Parents: Public Preschools and Parents
in Soviet Pedagogical Publications, 1945–1989,” Journal of Family History 35, no. 3
(2010): 271–85.
26
Amy E. Randall, “ ‘Abortion Will Deprive You of Happiness!’: Soviet Reproductive Politics in the Post-Stalin Era,” Journal of Women’s History 23, no. 3 (September
2011): 13–38; A. E. Zvonareva, “Obraz ottsa v pozdnesovetskoi zhurnal’noi periodike,”
Zhenshchina v rossiskom obshchestve 1, no. 50 (2009): 64–73; Zvonareva, Sovetskoe
ottsovstvo; McCallum, “The Return,” 117–43; Claire McCallum, The Fate of the New
Man: Representing and Reconstructing Masculinity in Soviet Visual Culture, 1945–
1965 (Dekalb, IL, 2018); Marko Dumančić, “Thawing Soviet Masculinity: The Contested
Masculine Archetype in Soviet Film, 1956–1968” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 2010); Marko Dumančić, Men Out of Focus: The Soviet Masculinity Crisis in the
Long Sixties (Toronto, 2020). For efforts to transform fatherhood in Communist East Germany, see Peter Hallama, “Struggling for a Socialist Fatherhood: ‘Re-educating’ Men in
East Germany, 1960–1989,” East European Politics and Societies, June 2020.
27
For more on Communist morality, see Field, Private Life and Communist Morality; Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices
(Berkeley, CA, 1999); Brian LaPierre, “Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale: The
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in the political landscape, along with other new initiatives, fostered conditions
that allowed for a reconceptualization of Soviet fatherhood.
Khrushchev’s promotion of greater “socialist democracy”—that is, popular
participation in the administration of governmental organs, economic bodies,
and social organizations—fostered greater scrutiny of personal conduct. Mass
involvement in street patrols and other new or revived mechanisms for “peer”
surveillance and judgment resulted in increased inspection of men’s reprehensible behavior, such as public drunkenness or violence. So too did the revival of
house committees that watched over neighbors and the extension of comrades’
courts to apartments—a development that accompanied Khrushchev’s mass housing program, which allowed tens of millions of families to move to their own singlefamily apartments in the late 1950s and 1960s. These committees and courts played
an important role in disciplining men for unacceptable conduct, including toward
their wives and children.28
The campaign for “socialist democracy” reopened the “woman question”—
the question of women’s equality—as Soviet authorities acknowledged that
women’s domestic duties, including childcare, constrained their ability to be active in politics, the economy, and the public sphere.29 Although they called for
new household technologies and additional communal services to foster women’s
involvement in these sectors rather than challenging the unequal division of labor in the home, many ordinary people—including men—criticized men’s aversion to domestic work and called for greater male participation.30 A Saratov man
explained: “The man who doesn’t do housework along with his wife” hindered
Campaign against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956–1964,” Cahiers du
monde russe, nos. 1–2 (2006): 1–28, and LaPierre, Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia:
Deﬁning, Policing, and Producing Deviance during the Thaw (Madison, WI, 2012); Edward Cohn, The High Title of a Communist: Postwar Party Discipline and the Values of
the Soviet Regime (DeKalb, IL, 2015); Healey, Homosexual Desire, 238–44; Healey,
Russian Homophobia, 93–109.
28
Christine Varga-Harris, Stories of House and Home: Soviet Apartment Life during
the Khrushchev Years (Ithaca, NY, 2015); Lynne Attwood, “Housing the Khrushchev
Era,” in Ilič et al., Women in the Khrushchev Era, 177–94; Field, Private Life and Communist Morality, chap. 2. Comrades’ courts imposed sanctions on those who breached
social norms or committed minor criminal offenses; see Yoram Gorlizki, “Delegalization
in Russia: Soviet Comrades’ Courts in Retrospect,” American Journal of Comparative
Law 46, no. 3 (1998): 403–25.
29
Mary Buckley, Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor, MI, 1989),
140; Reid, “Women in the Home,” 162.
30
Melanie Ilič, “Women in the Khrushchev Era: An Overview,” in Ilič et al., Women
and the Khrushchev Era, 11–12; Susan Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the
De-Stalinization of Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61,
no. 2 (2002): 211–52; Aleksandr Byrulia, “ Ia vovse ne stydno!,” Rabotnitsa 6 (1960):
21; “Esli liubim nashi zhen,” Rabotnitsa 9 (1960): 16–17; “Komu stoiat’ u plity,” Izvestiia,
July 30, 1960, 6.
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party-state goals by making it more difﬁcult for women to be involved in “government administration and the building of communism.”31
The relaxation under Khrushchev of political and cultural strictures, including
censorship, allowed for public discussion about a variety of social problems, including family matters. Party and state authorities, professionals, and ordinary
citizens expressed widespread concern about the Family Law of 1944. They criticized the law’s economic promise, arguing that single mothers received inadequate state assistance. They also challenged the morality of the law: children
born out of wedlock were denied equal rights because of the prohibition against
naming paternity on birth certiﬁcates, and men used the law to exploit women
and then abandon them once they became pregnant. Both fatherless children
and unmarried mothers also suffered social stigma.32 Critics of the law, such
as writer Ilya Ehrenburg and composer Dmitri Shostakovich, lamented the
“thousands of tragedies” that unmarried mothers and fatherless children experienced because of “philistine convictions” that the children were “illegitimately
born.”33 A complex of social ills in the 1950s and 1960s, including the growth in
the Soviet divorce rate, unruly youth, and juvenile delinquency also fed the perception that “fatherless” children—whether a result of nonconjugal relations
or divorce—were a “risk group” more likely to engage in bad behavior.34 The
“complete” heteronormative family—buttressed by active fathering—was considered a bulwark against unruly youth.35 It was also considered essential for
boosting the nation’s population.
These family, youth, and pronatalist concerns informed Khrushchev’s decision to improve children’s education, which had implications for fathers and understandings of Soviet masculinity as well. At the Twentieth Party Congress in
“Otkrovennyi razgovor,” Rabotnitsa 3 (1956): 30.
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youth and juvenile delinquency, see Julianne Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet PostWar Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford, 2010); Fürst, “The Arrival
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1956, Khrushchev proclaimed that “the upbringing of children is a societal affair.”36 Although not a new concept, the Soviet regime breathed new life into it.37
Khrushchev explained that increased societal participation in child-rearing was
necessary because of the economic reality of many families in which single
mothers as well as both parents worked: “Many children ﬁnd themselves left
in the care of some relative or neighbor, and sometimes without any supervision
at all,” often resulting in “bad consequences.”38 In Khrushchev’s view, it was essential to expand opportunities for childcare, particularly nurseries and kindergartens.39 This would aid not only existing families but also women who wanted
to have more children.
The regime’s emphasis on “Communist morality” raised the question of how
best to inculcate certain values and behaviors among children. As party and government ofﬁcials as well as professionals promoted standards for proper conduct, they stressed the importance of parents, teachers, and society more broadly
in cultivating Communist morality among children so as to correctly forge the
next generation of Communists.40 “United and directed toward the same goal,”
Khrushchev stated, these forces could “extirpate completely and permanently”
the negative views among the younger generation, such as nihilism and disdain
for labor.41 Ideally the collective endeavor of many institutions and groups, including schools and families, would help “every young person turn into a ﬁghter
for communism instead of a time-server, a hero instead of a philistine, a collectivist instead of an egoist, and a champion of the new instead of an indifferent
conservative.”42 The context of the Cold War and the spread of Western cultural
inﬂuences among youth made this societal intervention even more imperative.43
To be successful in producing the next generation of Communists, educational
experts and activists argued, “family education” needed to harmonize better with
societal education. They advocated greater cooperation between preschools/

36
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schools and families as well as a uniﬁed approach to educating children.44 Both
were considered necessary not merely because of the idea that families could
bolster Soviet pedagogical goals but also because of a long-standing concern
that they could undermine them.45 Many parents, though well intentioned, knew
little about children’s educational needs or how their behavior could affect a
child’s development. Moreover, by negatively inﬂuencing children via foolish
habits, religious ideas, nationalist biases, and poor conduct—such as drunkenness—some families raised “idlers, barins [masters], stiliagi [stylish youth who
adopted Western clothing and listened to Western music], people with superstitions and prejudices.”46 Given these challenges, family upbringing “was not a private affair,” and educators dramatically expanded efforts to teach better parenting
in the 1950s and 1960s, focusing not only on mothers but also on fathers.47

It Takes an Entire Community—Including Soviet
Fathers—to Raise Children
The new ideas about children’s education and the policies that implemented
them stimulated dialogue about fathers’ roles in child-rearing. Commenting
on how the topic of children’s upbringing usually emphasized mothers’ roles,
an editorial in 1963 in the main preschool journal, Doshkol’noe vospitanie (Preschool education), applauded the growing attention to fathers’ roles as well as
calls for them to take greater responsibility. After all, there were many life examples “that eloquently conﬁrmed the importance of a father’s love and fatherly
attention to his child,” and, alternatively, “what happened when a father forgot
about his parental duties.” When it came to children’s upbringing, “fathers, like
mothers, did not have the right to stand to the side.”48
44
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Noting how students’ fathers often discredited the “great and noble title” of
father, a middle school director in Rostov explained in 1959 that the problem
with fathers was twofold. Particularly difﬁcult were the “bad” fathers: the socalled Don Juans, “deeply egotistical” philandering men who destroyed their
families to satisfy personal needs; the drunkards, who drank away the family
money, insulted their wives, and beat their children; and the self-aggrandizing
men who saw their work as so important that they did not participate in family
life. Yet it was not just these types of fathers who gave fatherhood a bad name.
At fault too was the typical father—an “honest, modest, and respectable person”—who usually played a marginal role in child-rearing. The director observed: “At best, he glances at a [school] journal, says how to solve a problem,
makes a casual suggestion. However, he doesn’t have a well thought out plan
and system for raising his children. He only passively supports the efforts of his
wife.”49 If the typical Soviet father became a more active parent, the director
argued, children would beneﬁt greatly.
At a 1964 meeting sponsored by the journal Doshkol’noe vospitanie, a publishing representative similarly pointed to the problem of the distant, nonengaged
father. One of the country’s main elementary school primers, he explained, which
was published in the millions each year, focused overwhelmingly on a mother’s
contributions: “We open the primer and on the sixth page [we read]: ‘Mama
cleans the frame. . . .’ On the tenth page we read: ‘Mama makes soup.’ On the
twenty-sixth page: ‘Mama works at the factory.’ And only somewhere around
the forty-eighth page does the papa appear, who is reading the newspaper.” After
meeting participants broke into laughter at these comments, the representative
continued: “And we have been publishing this primer already for many years, and
no one has thought—how can this be: mama, mama, mama, mama, and papa only
reads the newspaper. This is not the whimsy of the author, but a reﬂection of life, a
reﬂection of the role that we, papas, play in the upbringing of children.” The representative argued that it was time to promote the idea “that papas, in addition to
reading the paper, must become earnestly involved in children’s education.”50
Agreeing, another participant added that positive examples of fathers’ active engagement in home life needed to be included not only in children’s short stories
and literature but also on the radio and television. In his view, it was necessary to
broadcast examples of fathers who could “wash the ﬂoors and wash dishes without breaking them.” The power of example could be used to promote a new vision
of what a good father should be.51
Members of the educational community struggled with how to engage fathers.
Men’s attendance at parents’ meetings, conferences, universities, and lectures
49
50
51
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was sporadic at best. Moreover, they rarely engaged in community work at
school.52 Fathers’ lack of involvement was due in part to many men’s perception
that child-rearing was not their job. As one father remarked, “Having contact with
a school is women’s business.”53 “Going to a kindergarten is a mother’s affair, not
a father’s,” another man proclaimed when his wife explained that their son’s
teacher wanted the father to attend a school meeting.54
To appeal to men more effectively, educators and activists began to organize
meetings and conferences explicitly aimed at fathers.55 Schools were central to
these efforts. At a Moscow school in the early 1960s, for example, teachers sent
out invitations for a special fathers’ event and posted signs on school doors that
read, “The ﬁrst meeting for fathers: A heartfelt conversation about raising children.” At the four-hour meeting that ensued, fathers talked openly about the difﬁculties of child-rearing, exchanged accounts of their mistakes, and gave each
other advice. In one father’s view, “this meeting and conversation gave me a sincere push, and prompted me to look differently at fatherly responsibilities.”56 At
a fathers’ conference hosted by a middle school in Kuntsevo, 400 men heard a
lecture on the father’s role as an educator, and speakers (who were fathers themselves) discussed diverse issues such as blind parental love or excessive parental
permissiveness.57 “Parent’s universities” similarly began to target men, organizing lectures on subjects such as “fathers’ attitudes toward teenagers.”58 Znanie,
the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientiﬁc Knowledge (aka the “Knowledge” Society), as well as party and community activists
involved in advancing children’s education, likewise conducted “fathers’ meetings,” “fathers’ evenings,” and “fathers’ conferences” at clubs, palaces of culture, and men’s workplaces, such as factories and collective farms, which fathers
were presumably more likely to attend than gatherings at schools, particularly if
they could do so with work friends.59 Speakers focused not only on child-rearing
52
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and the ways fathers could positively inﬂuence children but also on the negative
inﬂuence of fathers who were “drunkards, parasites, and money-grubbers.”60 In
at least a few cases, public organizations also awarded certiﬁcates of appreciation to fathers for raising their children correctly.61
Soviet radio—such as the “radio-university for parents” in Penz—buttressed
efforts to edify men about children’s pedagogical needs. Radio broadcasts
included “the mother’s and father’s role in the family education of children”
and “fathers’ responsibility for child-rearing.”62 Inspired by a 1963 Moscow
school meeting for fathers that she helped to organize, journalist N. Makarova
decided to discuss the meeting on the radio. After receiving responses from listeners as far away as Erevan (Armenia), Omsk (Siberia), Orenburg oblast’, and
places she “couldn’t even ﬁnd on the map,” Makarova decided to continue her
broadcasts about fathers, families, and parenting, which generated a lively response from the public—over 1,000 postcards and letters by 1965.63
Parenting texts in the post-Stalin era also turned their attention to fathers. Although the highly respected pedagogue Anton Makarenko included fathers’ behavior in his examples of good and bad parenting in his foundational text, A
Book for Parents, ﬁrst published in 1937, most child-rearing advice from the early
Soviet and Stalin years assumed a female readership and focused on mothers’
roles exclusively, or primarily referenced maternal duties when they discussed
parents’ responsibilities writ large.64 While parenting texts in the post-Stalin era
often concentrated on mothers as well, some genuinely discussed both mothers’
and fathers’ responsibilities—such as The Mother and Father as Educators.65
Moreover, new books focusing on men and fatherhood were published in the
1960s and early 1970s, including Fathers and Children, The Greatest Responsibility Is to Be a Father!, The Father as Educator, Boy-Man-Father, The Father in
the Family, and Father and Son.66
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The growing interest in men’s family roles was particularly evident in two educational journals, Doshkol’noe vospitanie (Preschool education) and Sem’ia i
shkola (The family and school), which transitioned from being narrow professional publications in the early to mid-1950s to more community-oriented journals in the late 1950s and 1960s. Circulation expanded signiﬁcantly: from 1955
to 1968 Doshkol’noe vospitanie went from 42,000 to 320,000 issues per printing, and from 1956 to 1964 Sem’ia i shkola went from approximately 170,000 to
689,000. Moreover, the journals began to feature parental and societal input on
child-rearing as well as the advice and wisdom of educational activists and professionals. Increased circulation allowed them to reach a wider audience, as did
their availability in public spaces such as schools and libraries, at “readers’ conferences,” and in mass-circulation newspapers where some articles were reprinted. Both journals launched a multi-issue discussion about fathers in 1964.
An editorial in Doshkol’noe vospitanie explained the new focus: “We will publish negative materials that criticize fathers who avoid educating children in the
family, and we will speak in a strong voice about the mistakes of fathers who
through their own behavior hurt children’s souls.” The “main goal,” however,
was to present “positive” examples of fathers for emulation and to prompt new
conversations about fatherhood beyond the conﬁnes of the journal.67 A similar
discussion about what constituted a “a real man, a real father” unfolded in Sem’ia
i shkola.68 The journals included the views of not only pedagogues, teachers, and
psychologists but also a broad cross-section of society—including engineers
and doctors, single mothers and housewives, machinists and accountants, artists
and musicians, and many others. Indeed, they speciﬁcally appealed to ordinary
Soviet citizens for feedback.69
Discussions about fathers extended well beyond educational, parenting, and
professional venues in the late 1950s and 1960s. The article “Boy-Man-Father”
that effectively kicked off the 1964 discussion of fathers in Sem’ia i shkola was
published as well in Izvestiia, one of the leading Communist Party newspapers,
demonstrating the CP’s explicit interest in promoting a more engaged model of
fatherhood.70 The subject of fathering also appeared regularly in a subsection of
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the paper, “Izvestiia in the Family Circle.”71 In addition to Izvestiia, a wide variety of printed media, including the Literary Gazette, Science and Life, Health,
and the women’s press, raised questions about fathers’ roles.72 Many commentators noted disapprovingly that fathers considered child-rearing a mother’s job,
casting all responsibility for it on her shoulders, and called on men to become
active parents. After all, the obligation for raising children was in “equal measure” men’s.73 Others castigated not only fathers but also society more broadly
for men’s paternal negligence. “Despite talk about ‘women’s equal rights,’” one
author complained, “the father’s signiﬁcance in the family” was still minimized,
and the idea that mothers were to provide the “main care of children” persisted.74
Ideally, fathers and mothers would work together to raise children. According to
pedagogue Evdokiia Volkova, the model Soviet father was the “attentive father
who always found time to help his wife look after the children, and to actively
and responsibly participate in child-rearing: to do anything for his children, to be
occupied with them, to play with the little ones, to check their schoolchildren’s
lessons, to question them about their studies and their comrades, and sometimes
to provide help.”75 As a societal debate about fatherhood and men’s family roles
unfolded, some common tropes of fathers emerged.

The “Family Man”
One trope was the “family man,” the man who valued family and understood that
it was “an important part of personal life.” The family man did not suffer from the
“illness” that some fathers did—having “a passive, Oblomovite, consumerist attitude toward his family.”76 He did not view the family and domestic affairs with
“haughty indifference” and did not consider them unworthy of his attention,
merely a “woman’s business.”77 He did not consider home life boring.78 Nor
did the family man refuse his children’s requests to spend time with them by
71
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explaining that the “government gave him a free day to rest” and he would go to
a one-day “rest home” the next Sunday if they did not stop bothering him. Instead, a “genuine family man . . . helped his wife with everything,” such as going
shopping or cleaning the home, and “of course spent his free time with his children.”79 The family man understood that it was his responsibility as well as his
wife’s to attend to the children and to household tasks.80
The idea that a family man demonstrated his male virtue by participating in
domestic chores and child-rearing disrupted long-standing societal associations
of both activities with women and femininity.81 In one pedagogue’s view:
“Masculine worth and the thoughtful treatment of a wife are revealed in the ﬁrst
place in the [man’s] willingness and ability to help with housework.”82 According to psychologist V. Kolbanovskii, “The man-father, understanding what signiﬁcant work is placed on the wife and mother, tries his utmost to take on a
large portion of household work and participate daily in child-rearing.”83 In a
letter to the editor, Tatiana Morozova proudly pointed out how her father, despite having an important job, promoted a “friendly family life” and acted as a
“genuine family man” by doing most of the cooking, assisting with other household tasks, and engaging actively in his children’s lives. Moreover, this behavior
was not a threat to his masculinity: “he did not feel like a homeworker, but simply
knew his responsibilities as a family man and fulﬁlled them.”84 “My friends think
that by doing household work,” Aleksandr Byrulia explained, “I am losing my
masculine dignity.” But in his view, men who did not help with domestic chores
lost their masculine worth.85 I. Podsadnikov, who made dinner and washed ﬂoors
at home, agreed, noting that rather than laughing at him, his neighbors respected
him.86 The family man did not ﬂee from domesticity but embraced it as part of his
manly identity.
Men’s failure to participate in domestic chores, many claimed, was a recipe
for family problems and sometimes even marital disaster.87 In Captain Cherenkov’s words: “If we love our wives, if we love our families, then we should help
each other with everything. It is a great joy to live in friendship and to have a
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good family. If a man doesn’t do anything in the family, this leads to discord.”88
Marital tension due to household affairs was no small matter. It contributed to
women’s unhappiness, and in some cases could even lead to the collapse of the
family.89 For years, a woman noted, she had “suffered” because her husband did
nothing around the house, and small ﬁghts turned into bigger ones, until ultimately
she decided to leave.90 A man’s refusal to help at home could also undermine his
connection to his wife and lead to a cultural imbalance between spouses, with the
wife lagging behind.91 As a male participant in Semia i shkola explained, when a
mother-worker was compelled to assume all the household tasks and did not have
the time or the strength “to get involved in public affairs, study, and read books and
newspapers,” this could lead to a narrowing of her interests. These effects weakened marriages, for in these situations many husbands began to “consult less” with
their wives, lose interest in their opinions, and claim it was “boring” to be with
them or that their wives “didn’t understand” them. Some men even began to look
to other women for more satisfactory relationships. To prevent wives from “falling
behind men in spiritual growth” and to foster “friendship and love in their families,” one man argued, it was necessary for men to share domestic and child-rearing
responsibilities with their wives, to “work together and relax together!”92 A Soviet
propaganda poster from 1965 issued the same message, illustrating how if men
helped their wives with housework on Saturdays, they could have fun and ski together on Sundays.93
The idea that men’s reluctance to be real family men could foster narrowminded wives mired in domestic affairs was an interesting twist on an old concern. In the 1920s, Soviet leaders feared the negative inﬂuence on their families
of “backward” women, that is, uneducated and religious women who focused
on mundane daily chores and “petty-bourgeois” interests instead of the construction of a new socialist world.94 In the context of the 1960s focus on husbands and
88
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fathers, it was men’s unwillingness to do their part at home that helped to produce
this kind of problematic wife, who could then “infect” her husband with her
“‘petty-bourgeois’ psychology.”95 Men’s intransigence also helped to produce
bad mothers. According to a female socialist labor hero, if a worker-mother
had to shoulder all domestic work, including child-rearing, by herself, she would
have no leisure time “to read a new book or listen to a lecture” and would “begin
to fall behind in life.” “How good an educator,” this labor hero asked, “could such
a retrograde person be?”96 Men’s attitudes about family and home life inﬂuenced
women’s ability to be excellent wives and mothers as well as happier citizens.
Male engagement in household affairs was also considered necessary because
it reinforced the idea of women’s equality and promoted its importance among
children, an effect that was deemed particularly valuable for sons. Anna Mlynnik argued that the revolution had freed women, but that life was still difﬁcult for
them because women did not have “wives” to help them with their many household responsibilities. Fortunately, she explained, the “liberation” of women had
started in many families, “where the husband respects his wife as a person and is
not embarrassed to clean the ﬂoor or the dishes.” This kind of “new family,”
which challenged the traditional unequal division of labor in the home, helped
sons by teaching them that males too had domestic responsibilities.97 G. Fediai,
who enthusiastically undertook household duties alongside his wife, argued that
to achieve women’s equality “not only in society but also in the family, it is necessary to help her, and not be ashamed of this domestic work.”98 A male doctor
claimed his son had a positive attitude toward household tasks because their
family “did not underscore any difference between female and male labor.”99
By engaging in domestic work, good family men promoted a more egalitarian
family and helped children see women as equals with men.
A story about Evgeniia Alekseevna in Rabotnitsa (Woman worker), a woman’s
journal, illustrated the purported linkage between a father’s and son’s home behavior and their support for gender equality. A laboratory worker at an automobile
factory and mother of three children, Evgeniia Alekseevna nonetheless managed
to pursue higher education in the evening. How was this possible? One photo
showed her preparing food with her older son, who was wearing an apron and cutting vegetables at the kitchen table. Apparently he was “her right hand at home”
and helped to prepare meals (ﬁg. 1). Another photo showed her husband arriving
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Fig. 1.—Photo by G. Ter-Avanesov in “Mama uchitsia,” Rabotnitsa 9 (1958): 1. Color
version available as an online enhancement.

home with bag in hand. The caption read: “Petr Troﬁmovich is a genuine friend
and helper. You see—he’s just back from the store.”100
Undoubtedly inﬂuenced by their own domestic burdens and the difﬁculties of
juggling them while also working outside the home, many Soviet women argued that men who refused to participate in household labor and claimed it
was “women’s work” inﬂuenced children negatively, and even perverted their
“souls” by fostering disrespect toward mothers and women.101 A typographist
asserted that if “a husband shuns housework, the son no doubt will acquire
his habit. A husband who conducts himself as a barin [lord, landowner] at home
is a bad husband and a bad father.”102 “A son would turn into a barin,” another
100
101
102
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woman claimed, if he saw his father refusing to do housework.103 Men who acted
as “despots” by dumping household tasks on their wives, a woman similarly argued, taught young boys that a woman’s place in the home was to work, whereas
a man’s place was to rest. This kind of father could lead young boys in later years
to remember their mothers negatively, as “obedient slaves.”104 Pedagogues buttressed such arguments, claiming that a father’s contempt for and oppression
of the mother could also harm a daughter, leading her to “shut herself off from
the father and close her heart to him” and be “infected with negativism.”105 In
their view, if a father did not show respect for his wife’s domestic activities, he
would not cultivate this in his children, and if children did not respect a mother’s
work, they would not value her as a person. This tragic consequence was not just
a family matter: it could have broader societal repercussions by leading children
to disregard others, which would in turn impede efforts to achieve communism.106

The Father as Teacher
The family man was connected to another trope, the father as teacher, because
both father and mother were expected to edify children about Communist morality, behavior, and attitudes. Although schools, youth groups, and other institutions were tasked with advancing children’s moral education, Soviet leaders,
pedagogues, and psychologists emphasized that the family nonetheless played a
key role, since it was in the family that a person’s “will, character, and life principles were developed.”107 Men’s conduct as husbands and fathers was instructive to children—and therefore linked to the cultivation of principled future citizens. A male deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) explained, “[a] bad or good family man, a bad or
good father was a question” of signiﬁcant social meaning.108 The family was
the nucleus of the nation, the “ﬁrst collective, where the character of a future Soviet citizen was ﬁrst formed.” There children would become familiar with the
“laws of society,” and there, observing the behavior of the “father toward the
mother,” and of parents toward children, they would draw their “ﬁrst conclusions about the relations people have with each other” and receive their ﬁrst lessons on the importance of “mutual aid, solidarity, and goodness.”109 “Love and
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respect between parents” inﬂuenced children’s upbringing positively and allowed each child to feel like “a member of the family collective.” And by learning the importance of working together and helping others in the family collective, children would not become “egoists” later in life, allowing them to be
upstanding members of the broader Soviet collective.110
Although both mothers and fathers were expected to teach children “love of
work,” many assigned this particular responsibility to fathers when discussing
their familial roles. In part, this was because men’s behavior at home was deemed
critical for children’s outlook on work. A father’s laziness and “incorrect attitude
to household affairs,” critics argued, acted as a “brake” on the development of
children’s love for labor, hindering their later ability to be responsible Soviet
workers.111 When a father repudiated domestic chores, children emulated his
behavior and refused as well to take on such responsibilities.112 The father
who participated in housework, however, fostered love of work in his children.
As one woman explained, after her husband ﬁnally starting helping out at home,
her daughter turned into a little helper because she did “not want to be left
out.”113
The association of men with teaching love of work was also a product of economic reality and male privilege. Despite the huge number of women wage earners in the 1950s and 1960s, including in traditionally “male” jobs, Soviet women
as a whole had lower-paying, less-skilled, and lower-prestige jobs than men.
Workplace discrimination, combined with the persistence of the image of the heroic male industrial worker as a paragon of virility, promoted the idea that men
were more important workers than women and therefore better suited for cultivating “love of work.” In discussions about teaching this core Soviet attribute, fathers and grandfathers were encouraged to bring their children or grandchildren
to their workplaces to demonstrate how “wonderfully people work,” and they
were praised for their efforts to do so.114 Professor Levitov applauded industrial
male workers who “introduce[d] their children to industry, [taught] them several
industrial skills and abilities, and encourage[d] their technical ideas.” He underscored how a hardworking and successful father, especially an award-receiving
one, inspired his children to want to be like him.115 According to another commentator, it was important not to underestimate the power of a son seeing his father’s
name on the “Board of Honor” at work.116 Child-rearing experts and ordinary citizens also argued that it was a father’s duty to cultivate children’s inclinations and
110
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113
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to provide them with help in choosing a future job or profession, particularly since
many fathers were employed in the “leading industries of the people’s economy,
science, and technology.”117
Professionals, educational activists, and many others essentially endorsed a
collective model of fathering by pointing to the importance of men also teaching
other children. They could teach “love of work,” for example, as some in the Dinamo factory apparently did, by bringing a whole class of students to their workplace to show them what they accomplished and how the machines worked.118
The expanded emphasis on “practical education,” that is, vocational training,
which was a critical part of Khrushchev’s educational reforms, conveniently
provided fathers with additional opportunities for instructing children other than
their own. Men could participate in, or even spearhead, the development of
“school factories” or “friendships” between workers and students, in which students would learn about and work in various industries, gain skills, and come to
embrace “conscious discipline, a Communist attitude toward public property,
and a feeling of collectivism.”119 Fathers could also foster industriousness directly at schools. They could form “papas’ parent meetings” where they could
brainstorm ways to advance children’s “work” learning. One way to do this,
an engineer suggested, was for fathers to locate extra materials in their factories
for school projects. They could then initiate “children’s collective work” and develop activities that would not “simply amuse children but divert them from contemplative idleness and captivate them with constructive labor.”120
The teaching of politics was similarly associated with fathers in particular,
even though this essential task was considered a mother’s obligation as well.
This is not surprising as it reﬂected Soviet reality; despite women’s signiﬁcant
involvement in public and political life, they were largely excluded from high
politics. A male government leader argued that taking responsibility for the “spiritual” growth of a child was “one of the most important tasks of the fathereducator.” This meant that children’s upbringing could not be apolitical; instead,
it was connected to political instruction, to “raising a son or daughter in the great
truth of the great revolutionary traditions of the past, in the unshakable devotion
to high Communist ideals.”121 Indeed, a male socialist labor hero reminisced,
his father’s stories about revolution and war had initiated his “spiritual awakening.”122 An old Kazakh war hero proudly fulﬁlled this duty, recollecting how
117
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when his children “were still little and had only begun to walk on this earth” he
told them about “the Revolution, about Vladimir Ilich Lenin.” From this teaching, his son had become a true patriot, learning that “his ﬁrst responsibility was
to defend the Motherland if an enemy attacked her.”123 A pensioner described
how he told his son stories about the war and his comrades’ military feats, and
how he shared his medals with him, to inculcate “love for military service,” a requirement for young Soviet men.124
As with other lessons that fathers could impart, the father’s role as “political
educator” transcended the conﬁnes of his own individual family. As schools
sought to engage men more actively in children’s education, political instruction
became another way they could help. One man, for example, who became a
father school activist and the head of a class parent committee, explained that
he ﬁrst got involved in school life by talking about the Great Patriotic War
and his military comrades to students.125 The legacy of male revolutionaries
and men’s military roles in protecting the nation (notwithstanding women’s military participation in World War II) contributed to the linkage between fathers
and the teaching of political history and patriotism.126

The Father as Positive Role Model
In addition to the “family man” and father-teacher, the ideal Soviet father was a
positive role model. Fathers’ personal conduct and interests played an important
role in inculcating kul’turnost’—“culturedness”—in their children.127 The embodiment of kul’turnost’, a highly valued Soviet quality, involved modern, civilized, and educated practices. By wearing clean clothes, demonstrating good
manners, listening to music, and attending cultural events, for example, fathers
would instill kul’turnost’. As one woman noted, her father was an example to her
because she “saw how [her] father left for work, always tidy and collected.” Another woman explained how her father’s love of the Volga River and nature, his
ability to sing, and his knowledge of foreign languages shaped her development,
making her value the Volga River and nature and awakening in her an interest in
music and languages.128 Similarly, a contributor to Doshkol’noe vospitanie asserted, a boy “learned cultured behavior from his father, who always came to
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breakfast or dinner dressed in smart and neat clothing, and imitated him.”129
Conversely, a father with bad manners, such as one who did not remove his
hat at the kindergarten, would foster bad habits in his children.130 When a father
told his daughter to thank her grandmother for dinner but offered no thanks himself, “his words would not be convincing,” since young children “imitate adult
behavior.”131 As children learned from their fathers’ actions, and not just their
words, a Soviet father needed to model cultured and respectful behavior. “Good,
fair, and courageous” fathers would make their children want to be like them.132
Kul’turnost’ entailed self-control as well, so it was necessary for the cultured
Soviet father to model sobriety. The scourge of drunkenness—widely associated
with men—nonetheless plagued many fathers. Journal editor Zaluzhskaia argued
that small children needed to be raised in an atmosphere of “moral cleanliness,”
one devoid of drunkenness, because drunken behavior affected children negatively and fostered “rudeness, deceit, and hypocrisy.”133 “Children live[d] in
constant fear and hid in the corner,” the painter Tararova maintained, “when a
drunken father” came home. Intoxicated fathers ruined “children’s characters,”
destroyed their “nervous systems,” and turned them into anxious, short-tempered
people.134 “Drunkenness and boorish behavior toward women,” a marriage specialist asserted, “destroy[ed] the family and cripple[d] the lives of children.”135
Inebriated fathers caused emotional damage because of the fear they inspired
and the threat of violence they posed to children and their mothers, as illustrated
in a popular health magazine’s drawing of a young boy in bed who has woken up
from a terrible nightmare about his intoxicated and violent father (ﬁg. 2).136
“The tragedy” of a father’s drunken behavior was not only that it ruined his
own family but also that it served to undermine families more generally by fostering “cynicism and a lack of trust in human decency and friendship” in children, hindering their ability to have healthy relationships.137 It could also hinder
children’s future in another way: many children reacted by “studying poorly or
quitting school entirely.” One daughter explained: “In classes we did not notice
what was being said, and our thoughts were all mixed up. The entire time we
thought about our home, about father and mother. We didn’t have a childhood.
We did not see parental kindness and we did not understand what love for parents
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Fig. 2.—Illustration by Iurii Fedorov in L. G. Nebratenko, “Podumaite o detiiakh,”
Zdorov’e 12 (1967): 20. Color version available as an online enhancement.

meant. Fathers similar to ours are worthy of contempt, and such fathers are impossible to love.”138
Although some experts and ordinary citizens asserted that children could be
raised properly without a father, many others asserted that a father was necessary
for proper gender and heterosexual socialization, particularly among boys. In
pedagogue Kostiashin’s view, for example, “it was not enough for schools to
138
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try to inculcate in boys a chivalrous attitude toward girls, such as defending them,
letting them go ﬁrst, and making sure that they did not have to engage in heavy
physical work.” At home and at school, boys needed to be taught to have “deep
respect for the weak, and, above all, for a girl.”139 “The heartfelt tenderness of the
husband and father, his careful attention to every detail concerning the wife and
mother, his constant willingness to help and work with her on domestic burdens,”
an editorial explained, served as an important role model. Through this kind of
personal example, a boy “learned how to be a real man,” how to behave with girls
and women, and a daughter developed good “criteria” for selecting a boyfriend
and eventually a husband.140 Fathers who modeled such positive relationships
with mothers and daughters helped to raise sons who in the future would become
loving and attentive fathers.141
Pedagogues and psychologists warned that fathers who failed to demonstrate
love toward mothers, and instead treated them with contempt and verbal or
physical abuse, would hurt children and in particular hinder their sons’ ability
to have healthy relationships in their own lives. Advancing the argument “like
father like son,” they argued that the unhappy family produced by a father’s bad
behavior toward the mother would lead to another unhappy family in the future—
that of the son and his future wife.142 A father’s cruelty would provoke one of
two responses in sons: either they would want to protest it and defend their mothers, or they would come to think that “women deserved to be treated this way.”
Such nastiness could also foster “rudeness, boorishness, and the tendency toward violence” among boys, who, upon becoming teenagers, might become
threats to their female peers and subject them to vulgarity and abuse.143 Moreover, if boys did not learn to respect mothers at a young age, this could even lead
them to become cads, crass and heartless people, and rapists.144 Fathers’ disrespect for mothers in the form of inappropriate interactions with other women, such
as ﬂirting or having extramarital affairs, could likewise affect children adversely
and even undermine their belief in love. After ﬁnding out about a father’s affair,
for example, one boy not only despised his dad but also began “to hate girls.”145
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Paternal guidance was deemed especially valuable for the development of
healthy masculinity in boys and male teenagers. It was important for fathers
to conduct a “manly conversation” with their sons about how to treat mothers
and sisters as well as girls and women they did not know, and “not just on
the eve of March 8 [International Women’s Day],” and then to demonstrate these
words through actions; this would teach sons the “correct representation of masculine dignity, strength, and worthiness.”146 Writing to the radio broadcaster
Natalia Makarova about fatherhood, Vladimir Kuznetsovo remembered how
heart-to-heart talks with his father were critical in teaching him how to be a “real
man.”147 Having discussions with and hearing advice from fathers helped male
teenagers navigate the process of masculine self-construction. A father could
“inspire conﬁdence in the son” that he would be able to grow into a “real person.” Without a father’s guidance, but with a mother’s, a male teenager might
also conclude that certain qualities were “feminine” and try to reject them to
demonstrate his manliness, when in fact they were “human” qualities. A father
could show, for instance, that gentleness was not merely a womanly attribute. He
could also teach a son manly qualities, such as how to be a “good sport” after
losing a game, or about “male” activities, such a hunting or ﬁshing.148
Pedagogues and psychologists argued that fathers had a role to play as well in
educating boys and male teenagers about sexual matters. Teaching both younger
and older sons to love and respect girls and women, as already discussed, was
considered essential for their future ability to have a healthy and happy relationship (including sexual relations) with their wives—a normative goal. Some experts also asserted that when boys reached puberty, it was helpful for fathers to
provide useful information about changes in their bodies and sexual maturation.
It was “best of all in conversation with his father,” for example, for a boy to learn
that nocturnal emissions were completely normal during puberty. Fathers needed
to be careful, however, not to engage in overly explicit “physiological” conversations, because they could provide an “impure representation of the intimate side
of life,” contributing to unhealthy sensuality and cynicism among teenage boys.149
Experts also recommended that fathers have a “manly conversation” with their
teenage sons about the development of feelings for their female peers.150 In addition to these proactive steps, fathers needed to avoid certain behaviors because
they could inadvertently contribute to their sons’ sexual education in bad ways.
Pedagogues argued that swearing, for example, directed undue attention to the
146
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sexual sphere and fostered unhealthy interests in women. It also contributed to
boys seeing girls and women as sexual objects to be used rather than as full human beings.151
Some participants in the debate on fatherhood lamented the lack of male inﬂuence in schools and families, noting how common it was for boys to learn primarily from women. In their view, inadequate “male education” could adversely
affect boys and contribute to “weak development and a damaged character.”152
This made the need for an engaged and attentive father even more important. But
if boys had the wrong kind of father, such as one who subjected his wife and
children to verbal and physical abuse, this could be even worse. “The foolish
example of the father in the family,” a professor asserted, “[was] the main reason
for rudeness, boorishness and the tendency toward violence” among male youth.153
“Drunkenness, abuse, swear words,” and the “immoral behavior of the father toward the mother,” a doctor explained, was the “soil” upon which the sexual licentiousness of teenagers grew.154 Moreover, fathers who drank a lot and introduced teenage sons to alcohol, even turning them into drinking companions,
were responsible for long-lasting and terrible consequences among their sons,
such as criminal behavior.155

The Modern Father
The ideal Soviet father was also “modern,” that is, a forward-thinking man who
rejected outdated and traditional views regarding women and children. He did
not subscribe, for example, to older religious beliefs that men should be able
to beat their wives because it was allegedly women’s lot to suffer and be afraid
of their husbands.156 The Communist regime’s assertion that among the different
Soviet nationalities the Russian people were the “ﬁrst among equals”—that is,
more advanced and talented than other ethnic and national groups—informed
understandings of the modern father.157 Believing that certain cultural and family practices, particularly among some national minorities, degraded “female
dignity,” commentators in the debate about fatherhood often pointed to the problematic non-Slavic fathers and husbands who adhered to “backward” ideas and
ways, treating their wives and daughters terribly. Writing on this topic, L. Verb
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drew attention to the plight of a twenty-year-old Tatar girl whose father “wouldn’t
allow her to study, leave home, or even talk with female friends,” and that of the
Ingush sisters, whose “despotic father and older brother” forced them to wash
their feet and wait on them. Verb also referred to the fate of a housewife in Tblisi
whose husband would not let her go to the theater, the movies, or even leave the
house. Reportedly when he did catch her once trying to go visit her sister, her
called her terrible names and spit in her face.158 Modern men, by contrast, supported their wives and daughters’ wage labor, education, and many other activities, viewing them as having the same capabilities as males. As Tursunoi Akhunova, a labor hero and political leader, proudly explained, her Uzbek father had
rejected prejudices he had inherited from the past and instilled in her the idea that
a woman could achieve the “greatest deeds and feats.”159
Unlike old-fashioned and authoritarian fathers, modern fathers did not resort
to physical force to discipline children. Critics of this behavior associated it with
the prerevolutionary family, in which the authoritarian father brutalized his children and wife.160 They argued that physical punishment was bad for children,
producing fear and anxiety and, in some cases, feelings of inferiority.161 “The
method of the ﬁst or the whip is unacceptable in child-rearing,” D. Vol’ﬁnzon
proclaimed. Moreover, it did not generate the desired results as many fathers
thought it would. Instead of cultivating respect, love, and obedience, it produced
a rift “between the father and children.”162 According to a journalist, when a father used physical violence “this was not strength, but weakness,” not an expression of will “but a lack of will,” “not hardness but [a] pathetic lack of character.”163 The strength of a father’s authority, the builder F. Roziner maintained,
was generated through his “goodness, tact, the ability to internally instill in his
children his love and respect for them and their interests, and in his ability to lead
them via his charm. The ‘father’s hand’—strong and good—was what supported
and protected children from the foolish.”164
The modern father, in contrast to the traditional father, also acted as a friend to
his children. He was not the kind of breadwinner excoriated by the nineteenthcentury writer Belinsky, a head of the family “from the past, from a time left behind” who mistakenly “thought it was necessary to separate himself from his
children via his strictness, severity, and inaccessible importance.” Instead, the
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modern father respected children and valued their friendship.165 He spent quality
time with them—such as going on walks and attending sporting and musical
events together.166 Moreover, the modern father listened to his children and learned
about their ideas and concerns, instead of just lecturing and disciplining them.

Fatherhood in Service to the Nation, to Children, and to Oneself
Fatherhood was conceived of as not only a personal or family responsibility but
also a civic obligation.167 Advocates of greater paternal involvement quoted the
pedagogue Makarenko’s words: “You are not only a citizen. You are also a father. And you should strive to fulﬁll your parenting duties as well as possible.”168 They argued that active fathering was “an honorable civic duty to the
Motherland.” By working hand in hand with a mother to raise children, the father would encourage the “ﬁrst sprouts of communism” to “blossom” in them.169
And if for some reason a wayward son developed, “a son who had grown up
under the same roof as a Communist father” but who then undermined the pillars
of communism, the Central Committee of the Communist Party determined that
the Communist father had “not fulﬁlled his civic” or “party duties.”170 As these
ideas suggest, if in earlier years the father’s role had primarily been to provide
for and protect his family, by the 1950s and 1960s it came to include much more.
Indeed, as “the teacher of all the working people of the world,” the Soviet man
had a responsibility to engage actively in child-rearing for not only his people
and government “but also the whole world!”171
Men had a duty as well to engage actively in child-rearing for children’s sake.
Child-rearing experts and activists, as well as ordinary Soviet citizens, asserted
the signiﬁcance and power of “fatherly love, fatherly attention to children,” to
their happiness and proper development.172 It was “difﬁcult to overestimate” the
role of fathers in “strengthening the moral foundations” of the son, the family.173
Conversely, if fathers were “foreign” to children and failed to show them love, respect, and attention, this would damage their “moral character,” their “psyche,” and
in some cases lead to “nervous diseases” or even criminal behavior.174 Although it
165
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was not considered ideal, pedagogues and others recognized the occasional necessity of divorce, not least because of the deleterious effects on children that
unhappy marriages could cause, such as increased nervousness and sometimes
even “hysteria.” If fathers left families because of divorce, however, they needed
to stay connected to their sons and daughters, for children suffered greatly when
fathers abandoned them.175
Discourses of fatherhood naturalized and gloriﬁed it. Social experts and many
men themselves characterized the yearning to be fathers as instinctual. Professor
Malinvoskii, for example, asserted that a strong paternal and maternal instinct
was “inherent in everyone.”176 “The paternal instinct,” a father claimed in Sem’ia
i skhola, “was no less important than the maternal” one.177 Fatherhood was also
extolled as a source of great satisfaction. Makarova, the radio broadcaster, argued
that it was “not only the children who need the attention and advice of the father,
but also the father [who needs the children]” because “concern about the child,
the sense of connection to the inner lives of one’s children, elevates a man’s soul,
and the feeling of fatherhood is a wonderful and noble feeling that enriches a
man’s life with indispensable joy.”178 A male socialist labor hero acknowledged
that “everyone experiences fatherly feeling in their own way,” but he also asserted
that if a man did not experience “the joy of fatherhood” and was “indifferent” to
the birth of a child, he was “spiritually a poor person.”179 In these formulations,
fatherhood was an innate and vital part of masculinity that was essential for a
man’s happiness.
The reconﬁguration of Soviet fatherhood in the late 1950s and 1960s contributed to the development of a more family-oriented model of Communist manhood by offering men a publicly valorized identity as fathers and new opportunities to realize their manliness through an investment in the paternal. As a
lieutenant colonel observed: “Father! What a proud title. In it is everything—
good-heartedness, tenderness, male strength, and fairness.”180 Signiﬁcantly, however, Soviet authorities never accorded fatherhood the same value as motherhood. There were no fatherly equivalents, for example, of all-Union maternity
medals such as the Order of Maternal Glory or the Hero Mother Medal. Still,
the promotion of the new Soviet father marked a departure from earlier discourses
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of manhood, which emphasized the importance of men’s public contributions to
the building of socialism, but not their familial contributions to it.
Although the image of the new Soviet father was reconﬁgured, it was still
manly, eschewing feminization. Like other ofﬁcially valorized and dominant
constructs of manhood, this ideal entailed a manliness based on self-control,
in this case regarding alcohol, sexual behavior, swearing, and the use of physical
force at home—a model that implied men were naturally immoderate and violent. Like other models, it was based on service to the party-state. In adopting
new and “better” fatherly and husbandly behavior, the Soviet family man served
the nation by advancing Communist goals. His conduct at home fostered women’s equality, family happiness, the improved education of children, and the successful upbringing of future citizens who would honor Communist morality and
contribute to the further building of socialism. By moving beyond his individual
role as a father-teacher and educating other children, he contributed to proper
youth development. By supporting his wife and promoting family stability,
the new Soviet father and family man protected his children and defended the
country as a whole.181
Visual representations of fatherhood in the 1950s and 1960s reinforced the
new masculine ideal of the involved father. Photos, illustrations, and paintings
of fathers with muscular arms and large workers’ boots as well as dads engaged
in physical activities (sometimes strenuous) with their children proliferated
along with depictions of dads strolling with prams and reading to children in
their laps.182 In a departure from Stalinist depictions of Soviet men as revolutionaries, workers, and soldiers, ﬁlms in the post-Stalin era also began to feature celluloid protagonists as actual fathers “whose masculinity (and happiness) was
tied to the domestic sphere” and whose active engagement in their children’s
lives was not only good for them, but sometimes even redemptive.183 In addition, a more “explicitly paternalistic discourse” emerged about Vladimir Lenin,
the Soviet leader: images and stories in the popular press characterized him as an
“affectionate and surprisingly human” father ﬁgure in children’s lives.184 The
media also portrayed Soviet celebrities, such as the ﬁrst cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin
and internationally recognized athletes, as not only heroes but also good family
men, frequently featuring them alongside their children. Depictions of these
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manly men as fathers, together with the many depictions of strong and virile
non-celebrity fathers, underscored the masculinity of the attentive and loving
Soviet father.
It is unclear whether Soviet men felt empowered by the new model of fatherhood, if it boosted their sense of self-worth, or if instead they felt disempowered
or annoyed by the pressure to adopt new practices, including ones still viewed
by many as “womanly.” Signiﬁcantly, participants in the discussion about Soviet fatherhood frequently characterized men’s contributions to housework in
gendered terms, which might have alleviated some concerns about doing “women’s” work. Among other things, the father, and not the mother, was supposed to
carry heavy bags from the store, clean ﬂoors, take out trash, do home repairs. As
one man explained to his son, “there is no war now! Lifting heavy things and
doing work [at home] that requires great physical strength—is our manly business.”185 Moreover, notwithstanding the many calls for an equal partnership in
child-rearing and housework, men’s participation was usually characterized as
helping the mother/wife, with the assumption that women were responsible for
both. Speaking to this, one woman complained, “Why does he help—we both
work, so housework is a common endeavor. No one should ‘help.’ Just everyone has to do their share of the work.”186
In the debate about fatherhood, many men already acting as good “family”
men spoke with pride about their positive husbandly and fatherly behavior. Other
men dismissed calls to act differently at home. There was clearly some tension
between the discursive ideal and the lived reality of Soviet fathers, as studies
in the 1970s continued to reveal that women spent far more time than men on domestic chores and child-rearing.187 Meanwhile, initiatives to remake fathering
continued. Criticism of problematic fathers and husbands also persisted. This does
not mean that efforts to transform men’s personal conduct were a complete failure, but it does signal the tenacity of older gender norms about parenting and the
domestic sphere, and the continued association of both with women. Moreover,
the new construct of heteronormative paternal masculinity was only one of several forms of masculinity that men could and did perform. These included other
socially dominant models of manhood as well as alternative masculinities that entailed the enactment of manliness in ways that in some aspects overlapped or coexisted with the behavioral expectations of the new Soviet father and family man,
but in others contradicted or undermined them.
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Soviet Men in Crisis
As men’s family conduct came under greater scrutiny in the Khrushchev and
early Brezhnev years, professional concern about men’s limitations intensiﬁed.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, sociologists, demographers, doctors, and other experts began to research men’s many problems, including lower life expectancy
than women, high rates of alcoholism, and lack of accountability in the family,
workplace, and society. In this context, a “crisis of masculinity” discourse emerged.188
In addition to pointing to the biological weakness of men compared to women,
the unhealthy and destructive habits that undermined their health, and the dangers
of modernization that contributed to their propensity for fatal accidents and occupational injuries, the crisis narrative portrayed the late Soviet man as “having descended into passive and irresponsible behavior and having lost his ‘archetypal
male qualities’: initiative, independence, courage, and a sense of social or political duty.”189
Some critics of men’s alleged weakness argued that it was the lack of strong
and capable fathers, combined with mothers’ ability “to take care of everything
without help,” that contributed to the development of infantilized and feminized
boys as well as men.190 Others claimed that the marginalization of males in families and the corresponding masculinization of women in Soviet society had contributed to men’s emasculation and decline.191 Not coincidently, this critique accompanied a huge increase in women’s higher education and employment in the
second half of the 1960s and 1970s, including in previously male jobs such as
engineering. If some people blamed strong women and the Soviet gender order
for male degeneration, others proposed that women assume greater responsibility for protecting men and their health.192 This idea was met with outrage by many
women, who thought it was high time for men to “protect” their wives by helping
at home and participating in child-rearing.193
Women’s frustration with “bad” fathers and indolent husbands, in conjunction with sociological, health, and other studies that highlighted men’s problems,
fueled the idea that men, rather than women, were the “weaker sex,” and in the
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1970s and early 1980s, Soviet popular culture began to reﬂect the idea. Examples
include a 1982 ﬁlm, Take Care of the Men!, which featured a successful and strong
woman with a “weak” husband. During this time, as one scholar explains, “the
image of the good-for-nothing male alcoholic who can only play dominoes with
his friends, drink beer, and watch TV took root in the average consciousness.”194
Under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost’, criticism of
the Soviet system, including its gender order, exploded. While ofﬁcial Communist discourse still touted the importance of women’s emancipation, Gorbachev
and many others discussed the need for women to be “restored to [their] natural
destiny” so they could have enough time to tend to their “households, children,
making their homes feel cozy.”195 Meanwhile, a weakened economy and food
shortages made the double burden of women workers even more onerous. Many
Soviet women “felt crushed by emancipation.” In this context, the idea that
“women are tired of being strong and men are yearning for ‘normal wives’ ”
gained prominence.196
Academics, professionals, and the media in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s
continued to discuss Russian men negatively, pointing to their high rates of unemployment, “alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and extremely high rates of
male mortality.”197 Men’s inherent “nature,” allegedly, was the reason for much
of this destructive behavior. According to this perspective, men’s moral weakness, selﬁshness, and laziness stymied their ability to respond effectively to economic, social, and political changes and to act as responsible providers for their
families. Other critics of men’s behavior blamed the Soviet regime’s authoritarianism and “overemancipation” of women for denying men independence and
agency and “undermining proper relations between the sexes.”198
Perceptions of problematic fathers in the post-Stalin era and failed Communist manhood in the late Soviet era, combined with post-Soviet anxieties about
masculinity in a new capitalist-oriented environment, provide a window into the
appeal of Vladimir Putin as a forceful patriarchal leader. Putin’s public displays
of masculinity harken back to the Soviet-era images of hegemonic manhood that
underscored strength, self-discipline, and service to and defense of the nation.
Propagandists and Putin’s public relations team have constructed him as an
194
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engaged and robust ruler, an image that stands in stark contrast to the bad fathers
and incapable men publicly rebuked in the post-Stalin and late Soviet years as
well as the weak image associated with the late Soviet leadership and the postCommunist ruler Yeltsin. Given this historical context, and Russia’s decline as
a global power in the 1990s, it is not surprising that Putin symbolizes masculinity
regained and Russia’s regeneration. As many of his supporters proclaim, “[He’s]
a real man!”199
Putin’s government, meanwhile, has promoted domestic rhetoric and policies that have sought to right the gender disorder linked to the Soviet regime
by reasserting men’s “natural” roles as the breadwinners and authorities in the
household. Among other things, this has included the partial decriminalization
of domestic violence in 2017, allowing “lighter” acts of abuse that do not lead to
substantial injury, such as beating a woman but not breaking her bones, to go
unpunished. To encourage women to fulﬁll their “natural” feminine roles (and
to address a declining Russian birthrate), Putin’s government has launched pronatalist campaigns to encourage motherhood, and just as in the post–World
War II era this has included the promotion of “single motherhood.”200 It has also
successfully delegitimized feminism as a “foreign” import from the West and
mobilized homophobia to galvanize domestic political support by means including the criminalization of “homosexual propaganda” in 2013. These measures
have served to distinguish the supposedly morally superior Russia from the depraved West: in Russia there is a “natural” gender and sexual binary, in which
“real” men engage in sexual relations with “real” women and vice versa, and in
which feminists, transgendered people, gender ﬂuidity, and same-sex desire do
not exist except as so-called national perversions imported from the decadent West.
Putin’s performance of masculinity is multifaceted. He appears as a virile military commander who conducts successful wars and as a “dutiful son” who listens to veterans and “promises to keep the memories” of World War II alive; an
authoritative alpha male who stands up for Russia’s world interests as well as a
muzhik, an ordinary man of the masses who values independence, male comradeship, and patriotism; a “law and order” commander-in-chief as well as the
vigilante who promises to “rub out the bandits”; an intelligent and cultured man
as well as a crass man of the street who uses vulgar words and criminal slang.201
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These ofﬁcial representations of Putin, along with the violence perpetrated against
his opponents and Russia’s intervention in and even invasion of sovereign countries, contribute to his strongman image. As the many photos illustrating Putin’s
physical prowess and macho discipline suggest, his manliness is also “grounded
in the body and what the body can withstand,” whether spearﬁshing, piloting a motorboat, diving in the Black Sea, or doing judo.202
In the context of this article, it is worth noting that Putin is also represented as
“father of the nation.” This depiction recalls “the prerevolutionary image of the
Russian monarch,” the caring father ﬁgure (“tsar-batiushka”), and the Soviet
depiction of Stalin “as the stern yet loving father to all Soviet people.”203 Since
2001, Putin has conducted an annual mediated dialogue with the Russian people
in an hours-long television and radio broadcast, “Direct Line with the Vladimir
Putin,” during which citizens ask questions, issue complaints, and praise Putin,
and he responds to them as a concerned father ﬁgure.204 As “father of the nation,” Putin protects Russia from the “machinations of the West”—the pernicious foreign ideas, economic policies, political structures, and decadent ways
that purportedly threaten Russia. Putin also defends his subjects against corrupt
businessmen and “negligent ofﬁcials.”205 Interestingly, although he has notoriously been sexualized by the media, Putin is presented as the erotic “love object—
never subject.”206 While Putin’s handlers have promoted him as a national father
ﬁgure, sexually desirable male leader, and strongman, they have downplayed his
private role as a family man or father. When still married, Putin rarely appeared
publicly with his wife, and since his divorce in 2013 he has seldom appeared with
his lover, Alina Kabaeva, a former Olympic gymnast. He has also rarely been featured with his children, and there is a shroud of mystery around how many he has
with Kabaeva. Putin’s role as public father has been emphasized instead in images
of and stories about him “as a loving master of animals and children.” Symbolically, scholar Tatiana Mikhailova argues, they serve as “surrogates” for his actual
family members as well as for all “Russian citizens,” underscoring his role as “Father of the Nation.”207
As a strongman and father ﬁgure, Putin has reassured many citizens that Russia
is moving in the right direction. His assertion of virile diplomacy and his revitalization of the state and economy have strengthened Russia’s image abroad and at
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home. His masculinized nationalism, use of patriarchy and gender essentialism as
“tools of authority-building,”208 and political strategy of targeting “others” have
resonated with many people and served to explain Russia’s challenges and problems.209 Putin’s performance of masculinity and reassertion of Russia’s power on
the world stage have remasculinized Russia.
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